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LORETTA GALLENT, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
GARY M. BRIGGS, 
) Case No. 930776-CA 
Trial Court No. 920000001 
Defendant/Appellant. Priority No. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION 
The District Court entered its Memorandum Decision on 
August 5, 1993 followed by a Memorandum Decision on September 9, 
1993, and one on September 15, 1993. The Order was filed the same 
day, September 15, 1993. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
POINT I 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
The Defendant in this case has shifted positions regarding 
which state's law applies several times. First, it was Utah (see 
Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, Rec. 171), 
then Colorado or Texas (see Defendant's Reply Memorandum, Rec. 
210), then Louisiana and Texas (see Hearing Tr. p. 24), then Texas 
(see Brief of Appellant). The District Court held that since the 
action was based on contract, the action was timely filed in any of 
these states. The Defendant conceded at the hearing on the Motions 
for Summary Judgment that there was no statute of limitations 
problem if this is an action based on contract. (Hearing 
Tr. p. 26, lines 5-6; pp. 37-38) See Allen v. Greyhound Lines, 
Inc., 583 P.2d 613 (Utah 1978), where the Supreme Court would not 
disturb the trial court's findings on applicability of statute of 
limitations when supported by substantial, competent evidence. 
POINTS II AND III 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
The Defendant fails to state that the District Court found 
that there was no genuine issue of material fact in dispute and 
that was the basis for granting summary judgment. That is the 
standard set forth in Heqlar Ranch, Inc. v. Stillman, 619 P. 2d 1390 
(Utah 1980), (summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings and 
all other submissions, such as depositions, affidavits, etc., show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and this 
does not preclude summary judgment simply whenever "some fact 
remains in dispute"). 
POINT IV 
JOINDER OF THIRD PARTIES 
The standard of review in this area is that a trial court? s 
determination properly granted under Rule 19 will not be disturbed 
on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Seftel v. Capital City 
Bank, 767 P.2d 941 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), aff'd sub nom. Landes v. 
Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1990). 
STATUTES 
The text of the following statutes is set forth in Addendum A 
attached hereto: 6 Del. C. §§ 8-301, 8-302, 8-317, and 8-319(d), 
Louisiana Civil Code art. 1832, 1759, 3133, 3141; Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 70A-8-301, 70A-8-302, 70A-8-317, 70A-8-319(d), 78-12-35, and 78-
12-45. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Statement of Additional Undisputed Material Facts 
1. Defendant's statement of facts relating to the year 1981 
fails to mention that he became aware of the limited partnership 
while he was in Louisiana which is where he lived before going to 
California for a short time and he returned to Louisiana and lived 
there (with a short period of time in Colorado) before finally 
moving to Texas. (Depo. Tr. pp. 6-8.) 
2. Defendant was living in Lafayette, Louisiana in 1986 when 
the offer was made to discount the Crane Limited Partnership 
promissory note. (Ex. 1A. ) The letter accepting the offer was 
mailed to the attorney handling the matter in Lafayette, Louisiana. 
(Ex. 4.) Digicrane, Inc. was a Louisiana corporation that was a 
wholly owned subsidiary of Digitran, Inc. (Ex. 19, p. 1, 1[4. ) 
3. The relationship between the various entities and the 
nature of the transaction entered into by the Defendant in this 
case are all set forth clearly in the offering circular included as 
Ex. 19 in Defendants deposition and the AGREEMENT TO PREPAY CLASS 
A OR CLASS B NOTE which was signed by Defendant in connection with 
the offering is set forth in Ex. 4 (Addendum B) of Defendant's 
deposition. (Depo. Tr. pp. 34-38.) 
4. When Defendant prepaid $30,400 under the AGREEMENT TO 
PREPAY CLASS A OR CLASS B NOTE (Ex. 4), he was released from 
further obligations on the note which was due on December 31, 1990 
and was promised $30,400 worth of stock in Digitran, Inc. at $.75 
per share (or 40,533 shares of stock). (See Depo. Tr. p. 29, 
line 14.) 
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5. Because of securities law restrictions on the issuance of 
stock in Digitran, Inc. at that time, the delivery of the 40,533 
shares was delayed. (See Plaintiff's affidavit, Rec. 205, Depo. 
Tr. 42.) 
6. When the delivery was delayed, Defendant went to the 
Digitran office in Lafayette, Louisiana (Depo. Tr. p. 41, lines 24-
25) where at Defendant's insistence, Plaintiff delivered a stock 
certificate representing 32,190 shares in Digitran, Inc. (which 
shares were owned by her personally) "as security that good faith 
performance would be followed through with by Digitran/Digicrane." 
(Quoting Defendant's deposition, Tr. p. 42, line 19-20. See also 
Depo. Tr. p. 57, line 21.) 
7. The stock power which Plaintiff signed at the time was 
obtained by Defendant who was working with Merrill Lynch as a stock 
broker and was done at the insistence of Defendant so that it would 
be effective as security or collateral. (Depo. Tr. p. 42, line 3 
and Depo. Tr. p. 57, line 21.) 
8. The Defendant describes the security arrangement as 
something other than an irrevocable transfer: "I would have the 
option to use it [the stock] as my own if I felt it necessary to 
fulfill unpaid debts relative to Digicrane/Digitran." And the time 
for exercising this option (or default on the security agreement) 
was uncertain. (See Depo. Tr. p. 44-45, lines 17-25 and 1-15.) 
9. The underwriting process continued through 1988 and 
various documents were prepared and forwarded to Defendant for his 
-4-
information and signature. (See Exs. 8, 9, 10, 20, 21, 22, 32, and 
33. ) 
10. Because of the delay, Defendant was paid $1,824 in 
interest. (See Ex. 8 and Depo. Tr. p. 53, lines 3-5.) 
11. On November 22, 1988, 40,533 newly issued shares of stock 
in Digitran, Inc. was issued to Defendant. (See Plaintiff's 
affidavit, Rec. 205, Depo. Tr. p. 42.) 
12. The stock certificate 4206 issued on August 8, 1990, for 
32,190 shares, represents the shares which were pledged to secure 
issuance of the 40,533 shares issued on November 22, 1988. The 
pledged stock was to have been returned to Plaintiff at that time. 
Plaintiff did not discover that the pledged stock had been put into 
Defendant's name until she was reviewing stock transfers which had 
been sent to her by the stock transfer agent some time later. (See 
Exs. 11, 12, 13, and 14 and Plaintiff's affidavit, Rec. 205.) 
13. Plaintiff was involved in the relocation of Digitran, 
Inc. from Louisiana to Utah at the time and believed that her 
secretary had retrieved her stock from Defendant at the time the 
new shares were issued. (See Plaintiff's affidavit, Rec. 205.) 
14. Defendant was served personally in Utah with the summons 
and complaint. (See return on service, Rec. 006.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
The Defendant argues that Utah's borrowing statute bars the 
Plaintiff's action, but fails to acknowledge the exception set 
forth in the statute (Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-45) which is that it 
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affords the protections of Utah law to Utah residents who incur 
causes of action outside the state • That is the case here since 
Plaintiff is now a Utah resident. See Allen v. Greyhound Lines, 
Inc., 583 P.2d 613 (Utah 1978). He also ignores the triggering 
event for the running of the statute of limitations, namely the 
transfer of the 32,190 shares of stock into his name on August 23, 
1990 which would make the filing of the action timely even under 
the Texas two year statute for conversion. The District Court did 
not even reach that issue because the Court found that Plaintiff's 
action was based on contract and therefore, as conceded by 
Defendant, would come under the shortest statute on contracts--four 
years. 
The state with the most significant contacts and the focus of 
all the activities until Plaintiff moved to Utah is Louisiana which 
has a ten year statute on pledge agreements. This is also the law 
which would be "borrowed" under Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-45 for the 
benefit of Plaintiff. 
POINT II 
Defendant misstates the basis for the District Court's 
decision granting Plaintiff summary judgment. It is very clear 
from the transcript of the hearing and the Court's memorandum 
decisions that summary judgment was granted because there was no 
dispute as to any material facts as set forth with particularity on 
pages 2-4 in the Court's August 4, 1993 Memorandum Decision. 
(Rec. 244-246.) 
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In addition, Defendant fails to acknowledge the difference 
between parol evidence and extrinsic evidence. The District Court 
utilized documents signed by the Defendant starting with the 
AGREEMENT TO PREPAY CLASS A OR CLASS B NOTE in clarifying what 
transpired between the parties. The only parol evidence which was 
considered came from Defendantf s own deposition and was used to 
explain the relationship of the Irrevocable Stock Power to the 
transaction between the parties. Ex. 34, which seems to be a big 
issue for Defendant, is not even considered by the District Court 
in its ruling, 
POINT III 
Not only did the Court not err in setting forth clearly the 
undisputed facts on which it based its ruling, but clarified them 
in the Findings of Fact, which is what is required under the cases 
cited by Defendant. The Court identified the parts of the record 
which sustained its findings that the facts are undisputed. The 
cases clearly hold that a trial court may consider, in ruling on a 
motion for summary judgment, the pleadings, depositions, affidavits 
and admissions on file. The facts not in dispute clearly are 
sufficient to sustain the District Court's ruling. 
POINT IV 
The Defendant continually tries to bring issues into this case 
which the District Court earlier ruled were not relevant since they 
did not relate to the parties in the instant case. The Defendant 
filed a motion to join additional parties which the court duly 
considered and denied. This ruling was based on sound reasoning 
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and should not be disturbed since it did not constitute an abuse of 
discretion. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM IS NOT BARRED UNDER ANY 
OF THE APPLICABLE STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS 
The key issue as discussed in detail at the hearing on the 
Motions for Summary Judgment and as conceded by Defendant!s counsel 
is whether this is an action covered by the limitations statute on 
contracts. (See Hearing Tr. pp. 26, 37-38.) If it is, then the 
limitations statutes of Louisiana, Texas, Colorado and Utah are all 
at least four years and the action was timely filed. That is, in 
fact, what the District Court found. (See Findings of Fact, VI, 
Rec. 259-260, and Hearing Tr. pp. 46-47, lines 25, 1-3.) 
Under any analysis, including conflict of laws rules, 
Plaintiff's complaint was timely filed. Initially, Defendant 
asserted in his Memorandum Re: Motion for Summary Judgment 
(Rec. 171), that the Utah statute of limitations applied. 
Plaintiff, in response, cited Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35 which tolls 
an action when a person is absent from the state. See Van Tassell 
v. Shaffer, 742 P. 2d 111 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). See also, Lawson v. 
Tripp, 95 P. 520 (1908). Under this statute the time would be 
tolled from the time Digitran, Inc. moved to Utah in 1988 until now 
except for the few days that Defendant has been in the state for 
stockholder meetings or his deposition. Defendant then decided 
that Texas or Colorado law must apply. (See p. 4, Rec. 210, of 
-8-
Defendant's Reply to Plaintiff's Memorandum, "The cause of action 
in this case did not accrue in the State of Utah but accrued in the 
State of Colorado or Texas which are the residences of the 
Defendant at the time of the transaction.") Then it was Louisiana 
or Texas (Hearing Tr. p. 24) and finally, Texas in his appeal 
brief. 
Even under Defendant's shotgun approach, the calculations are 
faulty. The agreement which commenced this whole transaction was 
signed by Defendant on or about December 3, 1986. (See Depo. Ex. 
4 and Depo. Tr. p. 37.) The pledge of Plaintiff's stock was 
entered into October 8, 1987, but according to Defendant's own 
testimony, the trigger on when he could exercise his "option" to 
redeem the collateral if Digitran, Inc. did not perform was 
uncertain. In fact, the actual transfer of the stock certificate 
which was pledged, namely certificate number 2939, was not effected 
until August 23, 1990, after Digitran's obligation was already 
satisfied. The law is clear that a transfer of stock requires 
the following steps: (1) indorsement and delivery of the stock 
certificate by the transferor to the transferee; (2) delivery of 
the stock certificate by the transferee to the transfer agent of 
the corporation for registration in its books; (3) examination of 
the certificate by the transfer agent; (4) recordation of the 
transfer; and (5) cancellation of the old certificate and delivery 
of the new certificate to the transferee. See, B.Y.U.J. Legal 
Stud. Summary of Utah Corporate Law §6.35 (1982). Assuming 
arguendo that Defendant converted Plaintiff's stock, this did not 
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occur until Defendant requested the issuance of the stock in his 
name and the stock was issued on August 23, 1990. (See Depo. Ex. 
11.) This action was filed January 3, 1992, so even under the 
Texas two year statute relating to conversion this action was 
timely filed. 
However, neither Texas or Colorado meet the criteria set forth 
in Defendant's own brief. If the criteria for establishing the law 
which should be applied is as set forth by Defendant, an 
examination of those criteria leaves Texas and Colorado sadly 
lacking. Until Digitran, Inc. and the plaintiff moved to Utah all 
of the significant contacts relating to the execution of the 
original contract (the AGREEMENT TO PREPAY CLASS A OR CLASS B 
NOTE); the pledge of the stock to secure the original contract; the 
payment of the interest because of the delay; and the delivery of 
the 40,533 shares in satisfaction of the original contract took 
place in Louisiana. The only act which did not involve Louisiana 
was the transfer of stock certificate 2939 by Defendant in 1990 
effected by him through the stock transfer agent in New York. The 
only contact with Texas is that is where the Defendant was living 
at that time. All of the other transactions occurred while he was 
in Louisiana or Colorado. At all times the Plaintiff's residence 
and the principal office of Digitran, Inc. was either in Louisiana 
or Utah. In fact, the borrowing statute cited by Defendant, Utah 
Code Ann, § 78-12-45 would allow the action to be maintained in 
this state even if it had expired in Louisiana. (See Allen v. 
Greyhound Lines, Inc., 583 P.2d 613 (Utah 1978).) 
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However, it had not expired in Louisiana. The statute of 
limitations, (known in Louisiana as the prescriptive period) is ten 
years as set forth in the following analysis. Since Louisiana does 
not adhere to the common law doctrine evidenced by the Statute of 
Frauds because it follows the Napoleonic traditions of a Civil 
Code, the law of obligations governs contracts within the state. 
Generally, Louisiana law does not require that a contract be in 
written form, and it may be proved by testimony, or by presumption. 
La.Civ. Code art. 1832. Moreover, good faith shall govern the 
conduct of the parties in whatever pertains to the obligation. 
La.Civ. Code art. 1759. 
The District Court found that a contract had been entered into 
between the parties regarding the ultimate delivery of 40,533 
shares to Defendant. Thereafter, because of a delay in the 
delivery of this stock, Plaintiff entered into a pledge (or 
security agreement) relating to 32,190 shares of her own personal 
stock pending issuance of the stock in favor of Defendant by 
Digitran, Inc. Under Louisiana law, a pledge is a contract by 
which one debtor gives something to his creditor or the creditor of 
another as security for a debt or obligation. La. Civ. Code arts. 
3133, 3141. Louisiana courts agree that the prescriptive period 
(i.e., period of limitations) in such a case is ten years. See, 
Franklin v. Bridges Loan and Investment Company, Inc., 371 So. 2d 
294 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979). 
Not only would the Defendant? s assertion that the execution of 
the stock power constitute a completed transfer be inconceivable 
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under Louisiana law, but there are thousands of brokers around the 
country who hold their clients' stock who would be surprised. In 
light of the fact that Defendant was a licensed stock broker and 
understands the fiduciary responsibility which a broker has to 
ascertain the nature of the arrangement under which stock and stock 
powers are delivered, it appears disingenuous at best to assert the 
stock transfer was effected on October 8, 1987. Defendant has 
already admitted in his deposition that Plaintiff's personal stock 
was delivered as security to assure performance by 
Digicrane/Digitran. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT HAS NO TENABLE BASIS ON WHICH 
TO ASSERT A BAR TO INTRODUCTION OF EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE 
Defendant misconstrues the District Court's decision in this 
case. The Court clearly stated that the basis for granting summary 
judgment was a finding that there were no material facts which were 
in dispute. (Hearing Tr. pp. 59-60; August 5, 1993 Memorandum 
Decision, Rec. 244; Findings of Fact, Rec. 261.) The Court clearly 
outlined the facts not in dispute on pages 2-4 of the August 5, 
1993 Memorandum Decision (Rec. 261-263). 
The Defendant attempts to direct attention away from the basic 
agreement. That agreement was signed by the Defendant and his wife 
on December 3, 1986 and is entitled AGREEMENT TO PREPAY CLASS A OR 
CLASS B NOTE. As stated by the Court in the Memorandum Decision, 
It is undisputed that Defendant entered into an 
agreement to prepay the class note to Digitran. As 
a part of the agreement Defendant elected to pay 
$30,400, half the value of the original note, in 
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cash to Crane Development Limited Partnership. The 
following was part of the consideration given to 
Defendant for the prepayment: (1) Defendantf s 
promissory note would be canceled and delivered to 
him (2) Digicrane would execute an amendment to the 
Guaranty and Assumption Agreement, (3) Defendant 
would receive one share of Common Stock from 
Digitran for each $0.75 contributed by Defendant in 
cash upon the execution of the Agreement. 
Defendant paid the $30,400 and was guaranteed to 
receive the stock by June 1, 1986. 
The Court then recites the undisputed facts surrounding the 
subsequent transactions and concludes as follows: 
The 32,190 shares of stock given to Defendant by 
Plaintiff were admittedly given as * security for a 
good faith performance.f They were delivered at a 
time when Digitran had still not delivered the 
40,533 shares of stock pursuant to the prepayment 
agreement. There was no other clear obligation at 
that time to Defendant ... . Defendant has 
received the stock promised him in the prepayment 
agreement. Defendant has filed to establish why he 
is entitled to retain the other 32,190 shares. 
It also appears that Defendant is throwing up a red herring 
when he argues that the Court's decision rested on parol evidence. 
That is not what the Court said. On page 2, Rec. 244, of the 
Memorandum Decision the Court stated, "Defendant argues that 
exhibit 6, the Irrevocable Stock Power, is the only admissible 
evidence of the transaction concerning the 32,190 shares of stock." 
The Court also pointed out that the Defendant did not want any 
other document or testimony to be admitted in evidence. The Court 
ruled that Ex. 6 was only one of a series of documents in a 
transaction between Plaintiff and Defendant and that other evidence 
should be admitted "•.. explaining the context and understanding of 
the parties at the time of transfer." 
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It would appear that Defendantf s motivation in trying to 
exclude extrinsic evidence (not parol evidence) has a lot to do 
with the fact that documents signed by him establishes the nature 
of the transaction which is the subject of this case and it is 
consistent with Plaintiff's assertions. In fact, the ruling by the 
District Court is consistent with the ground rules which allow an 
examination of the circumstances surrounding this transaction. 
See, Sprouse v. Jager, 806 P. 2d 219 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); (can look 
to extraneous evidence to determine intent); Sparrow v. Tayco 
Const. Co., 206 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (Utah Ct.App. 1993). The fact is 
that the delivery of the stock power and stock certificate to 
Defendant by Plaintiff were part and parcel of a transaction which 
was commenced with the execution by Defendant and his wife of the 
document entitled AGREEMENT TO PREPAY CLASS A OR CLASS B NOTE in 
December 1986. That agreement contemplated the payment by 
Defendant of $30,400, his release from obligation on a note, and 
the delivery of stock in Digitran, Inc. to him at a value of $.75 
per share. Without reference to that document nothing which 
happens after that is comprehensible. There was a check paid by 
Defendant to Digicrane, Inc.; a release signed by Digitran, Inc.; 
an agreement to deliver shares; a pledge of stock to Defendant of 
Plaintiff's personal shares pending availability of new issue 
Digitran stock; and delivery of the appropriate number of shares 
(40,533) to Defendant—all taking place after the signing of the 
original agreement. 
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As set forth in Greqerson v. Jensen, 617 P.2d 369 (Utah 1980), 
several documents may be construed together notwithstanding the 
fact that they are not all signed by the party to be charged as 
long as some nexus is shown between them. In that case the Court 
looked to a deed which contained just the names of the parties and 
a detailed legal description of some real estate but which had not 
been recorded or signed to find an agreement between the parties. 
The Court stated: "Parol evidence will be considered if it 
convincingly shows that the signed and unsigned writings are 
connected to one another and have been assented to by the parties." 
That case is cited in Machan Hampshire Properties, Inc. v. Western 
Real Estate & Development Co., 779 P.2d 230 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 
cited by Defendant which actually supports Plaintiff's position. 
These cases go beyond what needs to be established here. As 
alluded to above, unless the transfer of the 32,190 shares of stock 
was gratuitous and done in isolation from any other contact the 
Plaintiff and Defendant had between themselves, it has to be placed 
in the context of that relationship. 
In the simplest view of this whole transaction, you merely 
ascertain the number of shares Defendant was entitled to under his 
agreement, namely 40,533. Then you calculate how many he actually 
did get: 72,723 shares, (and there is no assertion anywhere that 
he gave any additional consideration for any additional shares)--
subtract the difference: 32,190 shares, and that is what is owed to 
Plaintiff. Defendant can try to confuse the issue, but that is the 
bottom line. 
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In a more sophisticated fashion, the transaction as originally 
formulated in Louisiana where it took place was an agreement to 
convey stock, followed by a pledge which was clearly enforceable 
under Louisiana law, followed by delivery of the stock, which 
delivery had been secured by the earlier stock pledge, followed by 
the return of the stock pledge. Unfortunately, the Defendant was 
not forthcoming with the cancellation of the stock pledge and 
consequently this action had to be filed. 
Defendant? s position that no parol evidence can be introduced 
to explain the context for the delivery of a stock certificate and 
a stock power actually misses the point. First, the District Court 
ruling did look to extrinsic evidence--not parol evidence for the 
establishment of an agreement. Second, Defendant's argument is 
like saying that a check for the payment of the purchase of some 
property cannot be connected with the transaction to which it 
relates unless it is signed by both parties. It is ludicrous to 
take that position. That is like saying that if a person has 
overpaid by mistake for an obligation that he is not entitled to a 
refund because you cannot introduce extrinsic evidence to explain 
the relevance of a check which constituted the overpayment. 
POINT III 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S RULING IS SOUND AND 
IS BASED ON UNDISPUTED FACTS IN THE RECORD 
Contrary to Defendant's assertions, the District Court did not 
rely on the admission of Ex. 34 to find that Defendant had breached 
his agreement with the Plaintiff. In fact, this is what the 
-16-
District Court ruled, namely that this is a contract action and was 
based on the AGREEMENT TO PREPAY CLASS A OR CLASS B NOTE, (Depo. 
Ex. 4). Defendant's own characterization of the delivery of the 
stock was that it was "... security for the good faith performance 
... by Digicrane/Digitran." (Depo. Tr. p. 42, lines 19-20.) 
Defendant establishes the number of shares he was entitled to 
under the agreement as 40,533 shares. (Depo. Tr. p. 29, line 14.) 
A stock certificate number 4111 in the amount of 40,533 shares was 
duly delivered to Defendant on November 22, 1988. (See Plaintiff's 
affidavit, Rec. 205, Depo Tr. p. 42.) An interest payment to 
compensate him for delay in the amount of $1,824 was made to him in 
April 1988. (See Depo. Ex. 8.) The agreement has been fully 
performed and Defendant has failed and refused to deliver 
Plaintiff's stock to her, but merely says that it is being held for 
some undefinable and unquantifiable reason. (See Depo. Tr. pp. 44-
46. ) 
Under Point II above, Plaintiff explains the Louisiana law 
formulation of a pledge of corporate stock. As in many other areas 
of the law, Louisiana's situation is quite unique. It is 
instructive to examine the arrangement between the Plaintiff and 
the Defendant in relationship to Plaintiff's personal stock as it 
would generally be viewed under Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code. This is the law that would be applicable in both Delaware 
(Digitran, Inc.'s state of incorporation) and Utah. 
While Utah's version of Article 8 was amended rather 
extensively in 1989, and there are some conflict of laws questions 
-17-
which could be analyzed, the basic principle is the same. Under 
both Delaware and Utah law there is protection given to a "bona 
fide purchaser" of securities to whom a stock certificate is 
transferred if said purchaser has no notice of an adverse claim or 
is not aware that the transferor owns only a limited interest in 
the security. The purchaser acquires the rights in the security 
which his transferor had or had actual authority to convey. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-8-301 and 6 Del. C. § 8-301. "Bona fide 
purchaser" under both Utah and Delaware law is logically defined as 
"a purchaser for value in good faith and without notice of any 
adverse claim . . . ." "Adverse claim" includes a claim that a 
transfer was or would be wrongful or that a particular adverse 
person is the owner of or has an interest in the security. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-8-302 and 6 Del. C. § 8-302. There is also 
the concept under section 8-301 of a "limited interest" in a 
security: "The creation or release of a security interest in a 
security is the transfer of a limited interest in that security." 
Section 8-317 has to do with the protection of innocent third 
parties and indicates that a creditor's lien is not a restraint on 
transfer to a third party for new value, but the lien applies to 
the proceeds of the transfer in the hands of the secured party. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 70A-8-317 and 6 Del. C. § 8-317. As is the 
case in other areas of the law, a person who has notice of a defect 
or claim cannot take free of such defect or claim. In this case, 
the Defendant cannot hide behind rules which were not intended to 
-18-
protect him. There is no way he qualifies as a bona fide purchaser 
for value in good faith without notice. 
Finally, there is a very interesting omission in Defendant's 
brief involving the statute of frauds applicable to the sale of 
investment securities. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-8-319(d), (which is 
the same as 6 Del. C. § 8-319(d)) states an exception to the 
requirement of a writing to meet the statute of frauds: 
A contract for the sale of securities is not 
enforceable by way of action or defense unless: ... 
(d) The party against whom enforcement is sought 
admits in his pleading, testimony or otherwise in 
court that a contract was made for the sale of a 
stated quantity of described securities at a 
defined or stated price. 
Perhaps that is why Defendant changed his admissions to 
denials in his amended answer to Plaintiff's complaint since the 
admissions establish the existence of an agreement between the 
parties for a guarantee using Plaintiff's personal shares. Be that 
as it may, the publication by Defendant of his deposition 
constitutes the necessary admissions, particularly the price and 
number of shares he was to receive (Depo. Tr. p. 29, lines 4-14) 
and the existence of a security or collateral arrangement (Depo. 
Tr. p. 42, line 19-20 and Depo. Tr. p. 57, line 21). 
POINT IV 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S RULING NOT TO JOIN 
ADDITIONAL PARTIES IS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
The first motion filed by Defendant in this case trying to 
obfuscate the issues was for the joinder of additional parties. 
After the submission of memoranda on this issue and an examination 
-19-
of the record the District Court declined to add additional 
parties. As set forth in Seftel v. Capital City Bank, 767 P. 2d 941 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989), afffd sub nom. Landes v. Capital City Bank, 
75 P. 2d 1127 (Utah 1990), the trial court's determination properly 
entered under Rule 19, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, will not be 
disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. 
The argument made by Defendant in support of his position to 
join additional parties contradicts his argument that the District 
Court looked to inadmissible parol evidence. Rather than referring 
to extrinsic evidence signed by the party to be charged, Defendant 
would have this Court resort to parol evidence (correctly defined) 
to establish some claim for royalties that is not apparent except 
in Defendant's own mind. Refusal to do so does not demonstrate an 
abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. 
In fact, this argument was raised again in the hearing on the 
motions for summary judgment, and the trial judge reiterated that 
one of the bases for his earlier ruling was that a Utah court did 
not even have jurisdiction over the parties which Defendant was 
attempting to join. (Depo. Tr. p. 103, lines 13-20) 
CONCLUSION 
Not only has Defendant failed to establish that he has any 
right to the additional 32,190 shares for which Plaintiff has had 
to sue, but based on the undisputed facts and the law as determined 
by the District Court, Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. As complicated as Defendant has tried to make this 
case, it is really quite simple. Defendant signed an agreement and 
-20-
pursuant to that agreement received all that he was entitled to, 
but he has failed to return the collateral, which was to guarantee 
the performance of Digitran, Inc., to its rightful owner the 
Plaintiff. 
It is clear that the District Court's ruling is well-founded 
and should be sustained. 
DATED this \Cj day of January, 1994. 
HILLYARD, ANDERSON & OLSEN 
GARY tf. ANDERSON 
Artc^rney for Appellee 
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DELAWARE CODE ANNOTATED 
Copyright (c) 1975-1992 by The State of Delaware 
All rights reserved. 
*** THIS SECTION IS CURRENT THROUGH THE 1992 SUPPLEMENT 
*** (1992 SECOND SPECIAL SESSION OF THE 
136TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY) *** 
TITLE 6. COMMERCE AND TRADE 
SUBTITLE I. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
ARTICLE 8. INVESTMENT SECURITIES 
PART 3. TRANSFER 
6 Del. C. @ 8-301 (1992) 
-301. Rights acquired by purchaser 
[1) Upon transfer of a security to a purchaser (Section 8-313), the purchaser 
aires the rights in the security which his transferor had or had actual 
lority to convey unless the purchaser's rights are limited by Section 
)2(4). 
[ 2 ) A transferee of a limited interest acquires rights only to the extent of 
interest transferred. The creation or release of a security interest in a 
irity is the transfer of a limited interest in that security. 
TORY: 5A Del. C. 1953, @ 8-301; 55 Del. Laws, c. 349; 64 Del. Laws, c. 152, @ 
PES: 
WARE STUDY COMMENT 
(1) Shelter Provision. Like @ 58 of the NIL, 6 Del.C. @ 158, @ 8-301(1) of 
UCC provides that if a purchaser of a security has not been a party to any 
id or illegality affecting the security, he acquires such rights in the 
irity as his transferor had or had power to transfer. However @ 8-301(1), 
> its counterpart in @ 3-201(1) of Article 3 of the Code, denies protection 
i former holder who had notice of the fraud or illegality even though he was 
a participant therein. 
?he definition of "adverse claim" contained in @ 8-301(1) was added to make 
ir that an "adverse claim" may include one asserted by a person not himself 
.tied to protection of the security. 
(2) Rights Acquired By A Bona Fide Purchaser. Section 8-301(2) provides that 
ma fide purchaser in addition to acquiring the rights of a purchaser also 
lires the security free of any adverse claim. Under @@ 6 and 7 of the STA, 8 
C. @@ 186 and 187, if the indorsement or delivery of a certificate was 
lined by fraud, duress, mistake or without authority or after the owner's 
:h or legal incapacity, the possession of the certificate could be reclaimed 
iss the certificate had been transferred to a purchaser for value in good 
;h without notice of any facts making the transfer wrongful. Section 57 of 
NIL, 6 Del.C. @ 157, provided that a holder in due course held that the 
;rument free from any defect of title to prior parties and free from defenses 
.lable to prior parties among themselves and could enforce payment of the 
;rument for the full amount against all parties liable thereon. 
Jnder the Code, the protection accorded to a bona fide purchaser does not 
i on the security's negotiability or non-negotiability as it does under the 
6 Del. C. @ 8-301 (1992) 
j. Purchasers from a bona fide purchaser and bona fide purchasers are 
Dtected so long as the security qualifies as such under the provisions of @ 
L02, supra, irrespective of whether or not the security qualifies as a 
jotiable instrument under @ 3-104 of Article 3 of the Code. 
(3) Partial Transfer. Section 8-301(3) is new statutory law. It is not clear 
>ther the term "limited interest" refers to quantity or quality. 
^INITIONAL CROSS REFERENCES: 
"Bona fide purchaser". Section 8-302. 
"Delivery". Section 1-201. 
"Holder". Section 1-201. 
"Notice". Section 1-201. 
"Party". Section 1-201. 
"Person". Section 1-201. 
"Purchase". Section 1-201. 
"Purchaser". Section 1-201. 
"Rights". Section 1-201. 
"Security". Section 8-102. 
TES APPLICABLE TO ENTIRE ARTICLE 
/ISOR'S NOTE. --The Delaware Study Comments, which appear in the bound volume, 
re written in conjunction with the adoption and enactment of the Uniform 
nmercial Code in 1967. These Delaware Study Comments may be, in part, 
perseded by the amendments to the Uniform Commercial Code enacted by 64 Del. 
tfs, c. 152. 
/ISION OF ARTICLE. --64 Del. Laws, c. 152, effective July 13, 1983, repealed 
a reenacted this Article, substituting present @@ 8-101 to 8-108, 8-201 to 
208, 8-301 to 8-321 and 8-401 to 8-408 for former @@ 8-101 to 8-107, 8-201 to 
208, 8-301 to 8-320 and 8-401 to 8-406. No detailed explanation of the changes 
5e by the 1983 Act has been attempted, but, where appropriate, the historical 
bations to the former sections have been added to the corresponding sections 
the revised Article. 
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DELAWARE CODE ANNOTATED 
Copyright (c) 1975-1992 by The State of Delaware 
All rights reserved. 
*** THIS SECTION IS CURRENT THROUGH THE 1992 SUPPLEMENT 
*** (1992 SECOND SPECIAL SESSION OF THE 
136TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY) *** 
TITLE 6. COMMERCE AND TRADE 
SUBTITLE I. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
ARTICLE 8. INVESTMENT SECURITIES 
PART 3. TRANSFER 
6 Del. C. @ 8-302 (1992) 
•302. "Bona fide purchaser"; "adverse claim"; title acquired by bona fide 
:haser 
1) A "bona fide purchaser" is a purchaser for value in good faith and 
lout notice of any adverse claim: 
(a) Who takes delivery of a certificated security in bearer form or in 
.stered form, issued or indorsed to him or in blank; 
(b) To whom the transfer, pledge or release of an uncertificated security 
registered on the books of the issuer; or 
(c) To whom a security is transferred under paragraph (c), (d)(i) or (g) 
lection 8-313(1). 
2) "Adverse claim" includes a claim that a transfer was or would be wrongful 
:hat a particular adverse person is the owner of or has an interest in the 
Lrity. 
3) A bona fide purchaser in addition to acquiring the rights of a purchaser 
:tion 8-301) also acquires his interest in the security free of any adverse 
m. 
4) Notwithstanding Section 8-301(1), the transferee of a particular 
:ificated security who has been a party to any fraud or illegality affecting 
security, or who as a prior holder of that certificated security had notice 
n adverse claim, cannot improve his position by taking from a bona fide 
ihaser. 
ORY: 5A Del. C. 1953, @ 8-302; 55 Del. Laws, c. 349; 64 Del. Laws, c. 152, @ 
ES: 
WARE STUDY COMMENT 
ona fide purchaser is defined more broadly than the holder in due course 
r @ 52 of the NIL, 6 Del.C. @ 152. Under the NIL the holder in order to 
ify as a holder in due course had to take an instrument that was complete 
regular upon its face, before it was overdue and without notice that it had 
previously dishonored. The purchase also had to be in good faith and for 
e and without any notice of any infirmity or defect in title. 
6 Del. C. @ 8-302 (1992) 
"Value" is more broadly defined in @ 1-201(44) of the Code than it was in @@ 
, 26 and 27 of the NIL, 6 Del.C. @@ 125, 126 and 127, and @ 22 of the STA, 8 
L.C. @ 200. 
Under the Code, even though the security is incomplete or altered and even 
Dugh a purchaser obtains a security after its maturity date, he may 
/ertheless qualify as a bona fide purchaser. See @@ 8-203, 8-206, supra and 
305, infra. 
^INITIONAL CROSS REFERENCES: 
"Adverse claim". Section 8-301. 
"Bearer form". Section 8-102. 
"Delivery". Section 1-201. 
"Good faith". Section 1-201. 
"Indorsed". Section 8-308. 
"Notice". Section 1-201. 
"Purchaser". Section 1-201. 
"Registered form". Section 8-102. 
"Security". Section 8-102. 
"Value". Section 1-201. 
2R NOTE: For more generally applicable notes, see notes under the first 
ution of this part, article, subtitle or title. 
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DELAWARE CODE ANNOTATED 
Copyright (c) 1975-1992 by The State of Delaware 
All rights reserved. 
*** THIS SECTION IS CURRENT THROUGH THE 1992 SUPPLEMENT 
*** (1992 SECOND SPECIAL SESSION OF THE 
136TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY) *** 
TITLE 6. COMMERCE AND TRADE 
SUBTITLE I. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
ARTICLE 8. INVESTMENT SECURITIES 
PART 3. TRANSFER 
6 Del. C. @ 8-317 (1992) 
-317. Creditors' rights 
(1) Except to the extent otherwise provided or permitted by @@ 169 and 324 of 
Le 8, @@ 365, 366 and Chapter 35 of Title 10, and subject to the exceptions 
subsections (3) and (4) hereof, no attachment, sequestration or levy upon a 
bificated security or any share or other interest represented thereby which 
Dutstanding is valid until the security is actually seized in this State by 
officer making the attachment, sequestration or levy but a certificated 
arity which has been surrendered to an issuer of this State may be reached by 
reditor by legal process upon the issuer in this State. 
(2) An uncertificated security registered in the name of the debtor may not 
reached by a creditor except by legal process upon the issuer in this State, 
/ided the issuer is an issuer of this State or has its principal place of 
Lness in this State. 
(3) The interest of a debtor in a certificated security that is in the 
session of a secured party not a financial intermediary or in an 
^rtificated security registered in the name of a secured party not a 
ancial intermediary or in the name of a nominee of the secured party may be 
shed by a creditor by legal process upon the secured party. 
(4) The interest of a debtor in a certificated security that is in the 
session of or registered in the name of a financial intermediary or in an 
Brtificated security registered in the name of a financial intermediary may 
reached by a creditor by legal process upon the financial intermediary on 
se books the interest of the debtor appears. 
(5) Unless otherwise provided by law, a creditor's lien upon the interest of 
sbtor in a security obtained pursuant to subsection (3) or (4) is not a 
braint on the transfer of the security, free of the lien, to a third party 
new value; but in the event of a transfer, the lien applies to the proceeds 
bhe transfer in the hands of the secured party or financial intermediary, 
ject to any claims having priority. 
(6) A creditor whose debtor is the owner of an interest in a security is 
Ltled to aid from courts of appropriate jurisdiction, by injunction or 
srwise, in reaching the interest or in satisfying the claim by means allowed 
Law or in equity in regard to property that cannot readily be reached by 
Lnary legal process. 
6 Del. C. @ 8-317 (1992) 
5T0RY: 5A Del. C. 1953, @ 8-317; 55 Del. Laws, c. 349; 64 Del. Laws, c. 152, @ 
)TES: 
.•AWARE STUDY COMMENT 
Section 8-317(1) corresponds substantially with @ 13 of the STA, except that 
i STA permitted levy or attachment without actual seizure if transfer by the 
.der was enjoined. Section 8-317(1), as recommended by the UCC draftsmen, 
lid not permit a levy under any circumstances without physical seizure of the 
:urity. Section 13 of the STA was not enacted by Delaware. 
The language set forth above in the Delaware draftsmen's revision of @ 
$17(1) is similar to the language contained in 8 Del.C. @ 202 on "Effect on 
:achment and sequestration laws" except that references to 8 Del.C. @ 169 
le situs provisions of the Delaware Corporation Law) and 10 Del. Chap. 35 (the 
itutory authorization for attachment) have been inserted to assure that the 
Lsting law would not be changed by enactment of the Code. 
Section 8-317(2) is identical to @ 14 of the STA which was enacted as 8 
..C. @ 193. 
^INITIONAL CROSS REFERENCES: 
"Creditor". Section 1-201. 
"Issuer". Section 8-201. 
"Security". Section 8-201. 
E^CT OF 1983 AMENDMENT. —The amendment of this section in 1983 was not 
:ended to modify or affect the operation of the situs statute, 8 Del. C. @ 
>9, or the attachment mechanisms employed to bring stock into court. Castro 
ITT Corp., Del. Ch., 598 A.2d 674 (1991). 
'ENSE BY ISSUER. —The Delaware amendment to subsection (1) of this section 
ms that the apparently unconditional right of a holder of a valid stock 
rtificate to require a transfer of the stock on the company's books to him and 
> issuance of a new certificate is, in Delaware, subject to a possible defense 
the issuer: That the shares were adjudicated lost, stolen or destroyed, and 
\ bond required under 8 Del. C. @ 168 and which was fixed in that adjudication 
ild be insufficient fully to cover the cost, somehow measured, of the 
>spective double issuance. Castro v. ITT Corp., Del. Ch., 598 A.2d 674 (1991). 
IR NOTE: For more generally applicable notes, see notes under the first 
:tion of this part, article, subtitle or title. 
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All rights reserved. 
*** THIS SECTION IS CURRENT THROUGH THE 1992 SUPPLEMENT 
*** (1992 SECOND SPECIAL SESSION OF THE 
136TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY) *** 
TITLE 6. COMMERCE AND TRADE 
SUBTITLE I. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
ARTICLE 8. INVESTMENT SECURITIES 
PART 3. TRANSFER 
6 Del. C. @ 8-319 (1992) 
-319. Statute of frauds 
\ contract for the sale of securities is not enforceable by way of action or 
*nse unless: 
(a) There is some writing signed by the party against whom enforcement is 
jht or by his authorized agent or broker, sufficient to indicate that a 
bract has been made for sale of a stated quantity of described securities at 
sfined or stated price; 
(b) Delivery of a certificated security or transfer instruction has been 
spted, or transfer of an uncertificated security has been registered and the 
isferee has failed to send written objection to the issuer within 10 days 
*r receipt of the initial transaction statement confirming the registration, 
payment has been made, but the contract is enforceable under this provision 
/ to the extent of the delivery, registration or payment; 
(c) Within a reasonable time a writing in confirmation of the sale or 
shase and sufficient against the sender under paragraph (a) has been received 
bhe party against whom enforcement is sought and he has failed to send 
bten objection to its contents within 10 days after its receipt; or 
(d) The party against whom enforcement is sought admits in his pleading, 
bimony or otherwise in court that a contract was made for the sale of a 
bed quantity of described securities at a defined or stated price. 
rORY: 5A Del. C. 1953, @ 8-319; 55 Del. Laws, c. 349; 64 Del. Laws, c. 152, @ 
rES: 
\WARE STUDY COMMENT 
Jnder @ 4 of the Uniform Sales Act, 6 Del.C. @ 704, a contract for the sale 
joods or choses in action of $500 or more was enforceable only if some note 
nemorandum in writing of the contract or sale was signed by the party to be 
cged or his agent, or in lieu of such a writing the contract was enforceable 
bhere was acceptance and receipt of a part of the items of sale, or part 
nent, or if the goods were to be manufactured by the seller specially for the 
*r and were not suitable for sale to others in the ordinary course of the 
Lerfs business. 
Section 8-319 makes material changes in the statute of frauds provisions of 
6 Del. C. @ 8-319 (1992) 
I of the Uniform Sales Act and in some important respects also differs from 
> Statute of Frauds provision contained in @ 2-201 of the Code, supra. 
Under @ 8-319(a) any contract for the sale of securities is covered 
jardless of the amount. In addition a quantity and a price term must be 
eluded in the writing signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought 
his authorized agent or broker which indicates that a contract has been made 
: the sale of the stock. 
Section 8-319(b) differs from the comparable provision in @ 4 of the Uniform 
Les Act but is substantially in accord with @ 2-201(3) (c). Section 8-319(b) 
Dvides that the oral contract for the sale of a security is enforceable only 
the extent that delivery of a security has been accepted or payment has been 
ie. 
Section 8-319(c), comparable to the provision of @ 2-201(2), supra, binds the 
sipient of a confirmatory memorandum of the sale or purchase where the sender 
bound by the memorandum, unless the recipient objects to its contents within 
i days after its receipt. No comparable provision is found in @ 4 of the 
Lform Sales Act, 6 Del.C. @ 704. The merit of such a provision is that it 
aid eliminate the situation which arose under the Sales Act where the sender 
a memorandum could be bound under the Statute of Frauds, but the recipient 
jld choose to be bound or not be bound depending on whether or not the market 
other conditions were favorable to him. 
Section 8-319(d) providing that an admission in a judicial proceeding is 
Eficient to make an oral contract enforceable to the extent of the stated 
antity of described securities at a defined or stated price is analogous to @ 
201(3) (b), supra, except that @ 2-201 merely required a quantity term and did 
t require a stated price term. There is no comparable provision in @ 4 of the 
iform Sales Act, 6 Del.C. @ 704. 
The provisions of @ 8-319 will not be applicable to the transactions between 
broker and his customer unless the broker sells securities to his customer. If 
a broker is merely purchasing the securities as an agent for his customer then 
a relationship is one of principal and agent rather than seller and buyer and 
B-319 is inapplicable. 
FINITIONAL CROSS REFERENCES: 
"Action". Section 1-201. 
"Delivery". Section 1-201. 
"Party". Section 1-201. 
"Purchase". Section 1-201. 
"Security". Section 8-103. 
"Send". Section 1-201. 
"Sign". Section 1-201. 
"Written" and "writing". Section 1-201. 
ER NOTE: For more generally applicable notes, see notes under the first 
stion of this part, article, subtitle or title. 
LA. C.C. ART. 1759 (1992) printed in FULL format. 
LOUISIANA STATUTES 
IIS DOCUMENT IS CURRENT THROUGH THE 1992 SUPPLEMENT (1991 3RD EXT. SESSION) 
CIVIL CODE 
BOOK III. OF THE DIFFERENT MODES OF ACQUIRING THE OWNERSHIP OF THINGS 
TITLE III. OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL 
CHAPTER 1. GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
La. C.C. art. 1759 (1992) 
1759. Good faith 
Jood faith shall govern the conduct of the obligor and the obligee in 
:ever pertains to the obligation. 
LA. C.C. ART. 1832 (1992) printed in FULL format. 
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'HIS DOCUMENT IS CURRENT THROUGH THE 1992 SUPPLEMENT (1991 3RD EXT. SESSION) 
CIVIL CODE 
BOOK III. OF THE DIFFERENT MODES OF ACQUIRING THE OWNERSHIP OF THINGS 
TITLE III. OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL 
CHAPTER 5. PROOF OF OBLIGATIONS 
La. C.C. art. 1832 (1992) 
1832. Written form required by law 
When the law requires a contract to be in written form, the contract may not 
proved by testimony or by presumption, unless the written instrument has been 
stroyed, lost, or stolen. 
C.C. Art 3132 MODES OF ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP OF THINGS Booktn 
Art 3132. Termination of arbitration 
The submission and power given to the arbi-
trators are put at an end by one of the follow-
ing causes: 
1. By the expiration of the time limited, 
either by the submission or by law, though the 
award should not be yet rendered. 
2. By the death of one of the parties or 
arbitrators. 
3. By the final award rendered by the art}, 
trators. 
4. When the parties happen to compromise 
touching the thing in dispute, or when this 
thing ceases to exist 
C.C. arts. 1813, 1876, 1932, 3071, 8105, 3131. 
R.S. 9:4324. 
TITLE XX—OF PLEDGE 
Editor's note. Chapter 9 of the Louisiana Commercial 
Laws (R.S. 10:9-101 to 10:9-605) became effective on 
January 1, 1990. This Chapter regulates the creation of 
conventional real security in most movables and supplants 
the laws governing pledge (pawn) with a single device, the 
"security interest". R.S. 10:9-102 declares that all securi-
ty interests, if subject to Louisiana law, are governed by 
Chapter 9 of the Louisiana Commercial Laws.' 
Art 3133. Pledge, definition 
The pledge is a contract by which one debtor 
gives something to his creditor as a security 
for his debt 
C C arts. 1756, 1891, 1906 to 1908, 1913, 1914, 1916, 
1971,2705 et seq., 2926, 3068, 3135, 3140 et seq., 3221, 
3477. 
RJS. 1:59, 9:4321, 9:4331 to 9:4343, 9:5391, 9:5521 to 
9:5538,10:9-102, 10:9-206, 10:9-307. 
Art 3133.1. Relation to Chapter 9 of the 
Louisiana Commercial Laws 
This Title shall apply to pledges of movables 
that are delivered prior to the time Chapter 9 
of the Louisiana Commercial Laws becomes 
effective, including without limitation those 
pledges that may secure future obligations and 
lines of credit, as well as to pledges entered 
into on or after the time Chapter 9 of the 
Louisiana Commercial Laws becomes effective 
that are exempt or otherwise excluded from 
coverage thereunder. 
Added by Acts 1989, No. 137, § 16, eff. Sept 1, 
1989. Amended by Acts 1990, No. 1079, § 7, eff. 
Sept 1,1990. 
Editor's note. According to Section 22 of Acts 1989, 
No. 137, Article 3133.1 became effective on September 1 
1989. 
Acts 1989, No. 137, § 20 provides: 
"It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this Act 
to amend the preexisting Louisiana security device laws to 
accompany and accommodate implementation of Chapter 9 
of the Louisiana Commercial Laws (R.S. 10:9-101, et set).) 
as previously enacted under Act 528 of 1988. It is further 
the intent of the Legislature that these preexisting Louisi-
ana laws, including without limitation the various statutes 
and code articles amended and reenacted under this Act, 
not be expressly or impliedly repealed by Chapter 9 of the 
Louisiana Commercial Laws, but that such laws remain in 
effect and be applied to preexisting secured transactions 
and, at times when so provided, be applied to secured 
transactions subject to Chapter 9 of the Louisiana Com-
mercial Laws." 
R.S. 1:59. 
Art 3134. Kinds of pledge 
There are two kinds of pledge: 
The pawn. 
The antichresis. 
CC. art 3135. 
R.S. 9:4321, 9:5521 to 9:5538. 
Art 3135. Pawn and antichresis distin-
guished 
A thing is said to be pawned when a mova-
ble thing is given as security; and the anti-
chresis, when the security given consists in 
immovables. 
C C . arts. 3068, 3133, 3134, 3154 et seq., 3176 et seq. 
R.S. 9:4321. 
For Annotatlvt Material*, »*e West's Louisiana Statutes Annotated 
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CHAPTER 1—GE> 
Art 3136. Obligations enforceable by 
pledge 
Every lawful obligation may be enforced 
by the auxiliary obligation of pledge. 
• Note error in English translation of French text; "en-
forced" should be "secured" 
C.C. arts. 1761,1913,1983, 2004, 3138 et seq. 
R.S. 1:59, 9:4331 to 9:4334, 9:5391,10:9-206. 
Art 3137. Conditional obligation as basis 
for pledge 
If the principal obligation be conditional, 
that of the pledge is confirmed or extinguished 
with it 
C.C. arts. 1767 to 1776, 1913, 3138. 
Art 3138. Effect of nullity of principal ob-
ligation 
If the obligation is null, so also is the pledge. 
C.C. arts. 3136, 3137, 3139, 3209, 3282, 3288. 
Art 3139. Natural obligation as basis for 
pledge 
The obligation of pledge annexed to an obli-
gation which is purely natural, is rendered 
valid only when the latter is confirmed and 
becomes executory. 
C.C. arts. 1760 to 1762, 1842 to 1844,1948, 1950, 2302, 
3036, 3138, 3282, 3288, 3295. 
Art 3140. Object of principal obligation 
Pledge may be given not only for an obli-
gation consisting in money, but also for one 
having any other object; for example, a sure-
ty. Nothing prevents one person from giving 
a pledge to another for becoming his surety 
with a third. 
C.C. arts. 1971, 1972, 3068, 3133, 3297, 3298, 3506(20, 
21). 
R.S. 10:9-206. 
Art 3141. Pledge for debt of another 
A person may give a pledge, not only for his 
own debt, but for that of another also. 
C.C. arts. 1910,1978, 3133, 3295. 
For Annotattva Materials, — W< 
JRAL PROVISIONS 
Art 3142. Things susceptible of being 
pledged 
A debtor may give in pledge whatever be-
longs to him. 
But with regard to those things, in which he 
has an ownership which may be divested or 
which is subjected to incumbrance, he can not 
confer on the creditor, by the pledge, any 
further right than he had himself. 
C.C. arts. 2452, 2934, 3133, 3143 et seq., 3290. 
C.C.P. art 426. 
& S . 10:7-501,10:7-502. 
Art 3143. Pledgor's rights at date of pledge 
To know whether the thing given in pledge 
belonged to the debtor, reference must be had 
to the time when >fche. pawn was made. 
C.C. arts. 3142, 3144. 
R.S. 9:5391. 
Art 3144. Subsequent acquisition of owner-
ship of thing pledged 
If at the time of the contract the debtor had 
not the ownership of the thing pledged, but 
has acquired it since, by what title soever, his 
ownership shall relate back to the time of the 
contract, and the pledge shall stand good. 
C.C. arts. 3142, 3208, 3432. 
R.S. 9:4341. 
Art 3145. Pledge of property of another, 
necessity for consent of owner 
One person may pledge the property of an-
other, provided it be with the express or tacit 
consent of the owner. 
C.C. arts. 1843,1919,1977, 2031, 2035, 2452, 2933, 2934, 
3146, 3147, 3506(30). 
R.S. 10:7-501, 10:7-502. 
Art 3146. Implied consent of owner 
But this tacit consent must be inferred from 
circumstances, so strong as to have Peave] no 
doubt of the owner's intention; as if he was 
present at the making of the contract,* or if he 
* Louisiana Statutes Annotated 
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70A-8-208. Effect of signature of authenticating trustee, 
registrar or transfer agent. 
(1) A person placing his signature upon a certificated security or an initial 
transaction statement as authenticating trustee, registrar, transfer agent, or 
the like, warrants to a purchaser for value of the certificated security or a 
purchaser for value of an uncertificated security to whom the initial transac-
tion statement has been sent, if the purchaser is without notice of the particu-
lar defect, that: 
(a) the certificated security or initial transaction statement is genuine; 
(b) his own participation in the issue or registration of the transfer, 
pledge, or release of the security is within his capacity and within the 
scope of the authority received by him from the issuer; and 
(c) he has reasonable grounds to believe that the security is in the form 
and within the amount the issuer is authorized to issue. 
(2) Unless otherwise agreed, a person by so placing his signature does not 
assume responsibility for the validity of the security in other respects. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 8-208; 1989, ch. ment, effective April 24,1989, so rewrote Sub-
218, § 17. section (1) as to make a detailed analysis im-
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend- practicable. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 15A Am. Jur. 2d Commer- Key Numbers. — Corporations ** 108,149, 
rial Code § 88. 466 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 18 C.J.S. Corporations §§ 253 et 
seq., 444; 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 1162 et seq. 
PART 3 
PURCHASE 
70A-8-301. Rights acquired by purchaser, 
(1) Upon transfer of a security to a purchaser under Section 70A-8-313, the 
purchaser acquires the rights in the security which his transferor had, or had 
actual authority to convey unless the purchaser's rights are limited by Sub-
section 70A-8-302(4). 
(2) A transferee of a limited interest acquires rights only to the extent of 
the interest transferred. The creation or release of a security interest in a 
security is the transfer of a limited interest in that security. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 8-301; 1989, ch. 
218, § 18. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend-
ment, effective April 24, 1989, substituted 
"transfer of a security to a purchaser under 
Section 70A-8-313" for "delivery of a security" 
in Subsection (1); substituted "unless the pur-
chaser's rights are limited by Subsection 
70A-8-302(4)" for "except that a purchaser who 
has himself been a party to any fraud or ille-
gality affecting the security or who as prior 
holder had notice of an adverse claim cannot 
improve his position by taking from a later 
bona fide purchaser" in Subsection (1); deleted 
the former second sentence of Subsection (1), 
construing "adverse claim"; deleted former 
Subsection (2), which read "A bona fide pur-
chaser in addition to acquiring the rights of a 
purchaser also acquires the security free of any 
adverse claim;" redesignated former Subsec-
tion (3) as (2); substituted "transferee" for 
"purchaser" and "transferred" for "purchased" 
327 
70A-8-302 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
(2) Statements as provided in Section 70A-8-408, notices, or the like, sent 
by the issuer of uncertificated securities and instructions as provided in Sec-
tion 70A-8-308 are neither negotiable instruments nor certificated securities. 
(3) In any action on a security: 
(a) unless specifically denied in the pleadings, each signature on a 
certificated security, in a necessary indorsement, on an initial transaction 
statement, or on an instruction, is admitted; 
(b) if the effectiveness of a signature is put in issue, the burden of 
establishing it is on the party claiming under the signature, but the 
signature is presumed to be genuine or authorized; 
(c) if signatures on a certificated security are admitted or established, 
production of the security entitles a holder to recover on it unless the 
defendant establishes a defense or a defect going to the validity of the 
security; 
(d) if signatures on an initial transaction statement are admitted or 
established, the facts stated in the statement are presumed to be true as 
of the time of its issuance; and 
(e) after it is shown that a defense or defect exists, the plaintiff has the 
burden of establishing that he, or some person under whom he claims, is a 
person against whom the defense or defect is ineffective as provided in 
Section 70A-8-202. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 8-105; 1989, ch. ment, effective February 11, 1991, corrected a 
218, § 6; 1991, ch. 5, § 79. punctuation error in Subsection (3)(e). 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend-
PART 3 
PURCHASE 
70A-8-302. "Bona fide purchaser" — "Adverse claim" — 
Title acquired by bona fide purchaser. 
(1) A "bona fide purchaser" is a purchaser for value in good faith and with-
out notice of any adverse claim: 
(a) who takes delivery of a certificated security in bearer form or in 
registered form, issued or indorsed to him or in blank; 
(b) to whom the transfer, pledge, or release of an uncertificated secu-
rity is registered on the books of the issuer; or 
(c) to whom a security is transferred under the provisions of Subsection 
70A-8-313(l)(c), (d)(i), or (g). 
(2) "Adverse claim" includes a claim that a transfer was or would be wrong-
ful or that a particular adverse person is the owner of or has an interest in the 
security. 
(3) A bona fide purchaser in addition to acquiring the rights of a purchaser 
under Section 70A-8-301 also acquires his interest in the security free of any 
adverse claim. 
(4) Notwithstanding Subsection 70A-8-30K1), the transferee of a particular 
certificated security who has been a party to any fraud or illegality affecting 
the security, or who as a prior holder of that certificated security had notice of 
an adverse claim, cannot improve his position by taking from a bona fide 
purchaser. 
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History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 8-315; 1989, ch. deleted "the provisions of this chapter on unau-
218, S 32. thorized indorsements" following "against him 
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend- under"; in Subsection (3), substituted "certifi-
ment, effective April 24, 1989, in Subsection cated security, or to compel the origination of a 
(1), inserted the designations, substituted "cer- transfer instruction" for ,,8ecurity,,, substituted 
tificated security wrongfully transferred* for «fae transfer of a certificated or uncertificated 
"security or" in (a), substituted ^certificated se-
 8 e c u r i t o i n e d and ft certificated security" 
cunty representing";or security evidencing"
 for ^ ^ ^ o i n e d ^ ^ security"; and 
m ( b ) , a n d ^ a d d e d ( c ) ; m S u ^ o n ( % inserted ^
 l i f l t i c ^ p u n c t u a t ion changes 
of a certificated security, substituted a new .^ rfiouL 
certificated security" for "new security," and ""^s 1 1 0 1 1 *-
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 15A Am. Jur. 2d Commer- A.L.R. — l i s pendens in suit to compel stock 
cial Code § 108. transfer, 48 A.L.R.4th 731. 
C.J.S. — 18 C J .S. Corporations § 439, 19 Key Numbers. — Corporations «=» 134,148, 
CJ.S. Corporations § 1159 et seq. 466 et seq. 
70A-8-316. Purchaser's right to requisites for registration 
of transfer, pledge, or release on books. 
Unless otherwise agreed, the transferor of a certificated security or the 
transferor, pledgor, or pledgee of an uncertificated security on due demand 
must supply his purchaser with any proof of his authority to transfer, pledge, 
or release or with any other requisite necessary to obtain registration of the 
transfer, pledge, or release of the security; but if the transfer, pledge, or 
release is not for value, a transferor, pledgor, or pledgee need not do so unless 
the purchaser furnishes the necessary expenses. Failure within a reasonable 
time to comply with a demand made gives the purchaser the right to reject or 
rescind the transfer, pledge, or release. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 8-316; 1989, ch. demand must" for "must on due demand" in 
218, § 33. the first sentence; inserted "pledge, or release" 
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend- three times in the first sentence and once in 
ment, effective April 24,1989, substituted wof a the second sentence; inserted "pledgor, or 
certificated security or the transferor, pledgor, pledgee" in the first sentence; and made stylis-
or pledgee of an uncertificated security on due tic changes throughout 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 15A Am. Jur. 2d Commer- Key Numbers. — Corporations *» 130 et 
cial Code § 109. seq., 466 et seq. 
C J . S . — 18 CJ.S. Corporations § 435 et 
seq.; 19 CJJS. Corporations § 1159 et seq. 
70A-8-317. Creditors' rights. 
(1) Subject to the exceptions in Subsections (3) and (4), no attachment or 
levy upon a certificated security or any share or other interest represented 
thereby which is outstanding is valid until the security is actually seized by 
the officer making the attachment or levy, but a certificated security which 
has been surrendered to the issuer may be reached by a creditor by legal 
process at the issuer's chief executive office in the United States. 
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(2) An uncertificated security registered in the name of the debtor may not 
be reached by a creditor except by legal process at the issuer's chief executive 
office in the United States. 
(3) The interest of a debtor in a certificated security that is in the posses-
sion of a secured party who is not a financial intermediary or in an uncertifi-
cated security registered in the name of a secured party who is not a financial 
intermediary, or in the name of a nominee of the secured party, may be 
reached by a creditor by legal process upon the secured party. 
(4) The interest of a debtor in a certificated security that is in the posses-
sion of or registered in the name of a financial intermediary or in an uncertifi-
cated security registered in the name of a financial intermediary may be 
reached by a creditor by legal process upon the financial intermediary on 
whose books the interest of the debtor appears. 
(5) Unless otherwise provided by law, a creditor's lien upon the interest of a 
debtor in a security obtained pursuant to Subsection (3) or (4) is not a re-
straint on the transfer of the security, free of the lien, to a third party for new 
value; but in the event of a transfer, the lien applies to the process of the 
transfer in the hands of the secured party or financial intermediary, subject to 
any claims having priority. 
(6) A creditor whose debtor is the owner of an interest in a security is 
entitled to aid from courts of appropriate jurisdiction, by injunction or other-
wise, in reaching the interest or in satisfying the claim by means allowed at 
law or in equity in regard to property that cannot readily be attached or levied 
upon by ordinary legal process. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 8-317; 1989, ch. at the source"; substituted "an interest in a 
218, § 3 4 / security is" for "a security shall be" and "the 
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend- interest" for "such security" in Subsection (6); 
ment, effective April 24,1989, inserted Subsec- and made stylistic changes throughout the sec-
tions (2), (3), (4), and (5), renumbering former tion. 
Subsection (2) as present (6); in Subsection (1), Cross-References. — Water stock, appor-
inserted "certificated" twice, inserted "Subject
 Uonment u p o n ^ e o f l a n d f redemption from 
to the exceptions in Subsections (3) and (4)
 m o r t g a g e foreclosure, § 78-37-6. 
and substituted "reached by a creditor by legal
 W r i t 8 o f a t t a c h m e n t f R u l e 8 o f C i v i l p ^ 
process at the issuer's chief executive office in ,
 p , - ^ 
the United States" for "attached or levied upon a u r e * K u l e b 4 V" 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 6 Am. Jur. 2d Attachment C J.S. Creditors' Suits § 14; 33 C J.S. Execu-
and Garnishment §§ 39,305; 15A Am. Jur. 2d tions §§ 98, 99. 
Commercial Code § 110. Key Numbers. — Attachment *=» 165, 166; 
C.J.S. — 7 GJ.S. Attachment § 182; 21 Creditors' Suit «=> 8; Execution *=» 131, 132. 
70A-8-318, No conversion by good faith conduct 
An agent or bailee who in good faith, including observance of reasonable 
commercial standards if he is in the business of buying, selling, or otherwise 
dealing with securities, has received certificated securities and sold, pledged, 
or delivered them or has sold or caused the transfer or pledge of uncertificated 
securities over which he had control according to the instructions of his princi-
pal, is not liable for conversion or for participation in breach of fiduciary duty 
although the principal had no right to deal with the securities.' 
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History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 8-318; 1989, ch. which he had control," substituted "to deal 
218, $35. with the securities" for "to dispose of them," 
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend- and made punctuation changes, 
ment, effective April 24,1989, inserted "certifi- Cross-References* — Bailee not liable for 
cated" and "or has sold or caused the transfer good faith delivery pursuant to warehouse re-
or pledge of uncertificated securities over ceipt or bill of lading, § 70A-7-404. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Bailment to his own name; a mere bailee has no author-
A defendant was charged with obtaining ity to transfer certificates. State v. Jenson, 74 
property under false pretenses where he was Utah 527, 280 P. 1046 (1929) (decided under 
asked to keep stock certificates until the owner prior law), 
returned from a trip, but had them transferred 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 15A Am. Jur. 2d Commer- Key Numbers. — Bailment •=» 21; Brokers 
cial Code $ 111. *=» 100 et seq.; Principal and Agent *=» 159(2). 
C.J.S. — 2A CJ.S. Agency § 221; 8 CJ.S. 
Bailments §§ 97, 98; 12 CJ.S. Brokers § 129 
et seq. 
70A-8-319. Statute of frauds. 
A contract for the sale of securities is not enforceable by way of action or 
defense unless 
(a) there is some writing signed by the party against whom enforce-
ment is sought or by his authorized agent or broker sufficient to indicate 
that a contract has been made for sale of a stated quantity of described 
securities at a defined or stated price; or 
(b) delivery of the security has been accepted or payment has been 
made but the contract is enforceable under this provision only to the 
extent of such delivery or payment; or 
(c) within a reasonable time a writing in confirmation of the sale or 
purchase and sufficient against the sender under Paragraph (a) has been 
received by the party against whom enforcement is sought and he has 
failed to send written objection to its contents within ten days after its 
receipt; or 
(d) the party against whom enforcement is sought admits in his plead-
ing, testimony or otherwise in court that a contract was made for sale of a 
stated quantity of described securities at a defined or stated price. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 8-319. 
Cross-References. — Contract for sale of 
goods, statute of frauds, § 70A-2-201. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Oral coxl. arrangement. buyer written confirmation thereof and broker 
Oral c.o.d arrangement whereby buyer of never received a written objection from buyer, 
stocks paid broker only when stock was deliv- Prince-Covey & Co. v. Strand, 29 Utah 2d 224, 
ered to buyer was not void where within 24 507 P.2d 708 (1973). 
hours after each transaction, broker sent to 
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(b) Subsection (a) provides for actions not yet barred, and also acts 
retroactively to permit actions under this section that are otherwise 
barred. 
(2) As used in this section, "asbestos" means asbestiform varieties of: 
(a) chrysotile (serpentine); 
(b) crocidolite (riebeckite); 
(c) amosite (cummingtonite-grunerite); 
(d) anthophyllite; 
(e) tremolite; or 
(f) actinolite. 
History: C. 1953,78-12-33.5, enacted by L. came effective on Apnl 25, 1988, pursuant to 
1988, ch. 208, § 2. Utah Const, Art VI, Sec. 25 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch. 208 be-
78-12-34. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Section 78-12-34 (L 1951, ch. bank deposits of money or property, was re-
58, § 1, C 1943, Supp, 104-12-34), providing pealed by Laws 1981, ch 16, § 1. 
that there is no limitation in actions to recover 
ARTICLE 3 
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
78-12-35. Effect of absence from state. 
Where a cause of action accrues against a person when he is out of the state, 
the action may be commenced within the term as limited by this chapter after 
his return to the state. If after a cause of action accrues he departs from the 
state, the time of his absence is not part of the time limited for the commence-
ment of the action. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-12-35; 1987, ch. 19, § 4. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
"Absence" from state. 
—Nonresident motorists. 
Applicability of section 
—Nonresidents. 
—Personal representative of estate. 
Burden of proof. 
Computation of time. 
—Penods of absence. 
Construction of section. 
—Strict 
Foreign corporation. 
—Pleadings and evidence. 
Laches. 
—Accounting. 
Purpose of section. 
Residence within state 
—Continual. 
Proof of presence. 
—Defendant's family. 
—Statute tolled. 
"Absence** from state. 
—Nonresident motorists. 
Nonresident motorists were not "absent" 
from the state so as to toll running of statute of 
limitations, although they left state immedi-
ately after automobile collision and remained 
without state, as they had an agent in person 
of secretary of state upon whom process could 
have been served. Snyder v. Clune, 15 Utah 2d 
254, 390 P.2d 915 (1964). 
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agreement was made; (2) by the debtor/obligor 
of the settlement agreement (or by a third 
party at the debtor's direction); and (3) the pay-
ment was made to the creditor under the set-
tlement agreement. Butcher v. ' Gilroy, 744 
P.2d 311 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation 
of Actions § 325 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 54 CJ.S. Limitations of Actions 
§ 261. 
A.L.R. — Promises to settle or perform as 
estopping reliance on statute of limitations, 44 
A.L.R.3d 482. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-12-45. 
ANALYSIS 
Applicability of section. 
—Counterclaim. 
Act occurring in other state. 
Choice of laws. 
—Utah court. 
Exception to section. 
—Assignee of resident's claim. 
—State resident. 
Accrual of cause of action. 
Applicability of section. 
This section is a general provision applying 
to causes of action that arise in a different 
state and are not reduced to judgment. Pan En-
ergy v. Martin, 813 P.2d 1142 (Utah 1991). 
—Counterclaim. 
Act occurring in other state. 
Where defendant's counterclaim for mal-
practice occurring in Idaho was barred by the 
Idaho statute of limitation, it would be barred 
here under this section. Lindsay v. Woodward, 
5 Utah 2d 183, 299 P.2d 619 (1956). 
Choice of laws. 
—Utah court 
In wrongful death action by Utah resident 
Verbal agreement 
A verbal agreement or new promise based 
upon a prior agreement barred by statute 
comes within this section. Whitehill v. Lowe, 
10 Utah 419, 37 P. 589 (1894) (decided under 
prior law). 
Promises or attempts by seller to repair 
goods as tolling statute of limitations for 
breach of warranty, 68 A.L.R.3d 1277. 
Key Numbers. — Limitations of Actions *» 
146. 
against Colorado residents, in which Utah 
court had quasi in rem jurisdiction, Utah court 
applied Utah law on matter concerning the 
statute of limitations, including the tolling 
thereof. Rhoades v. Wright, 622 P.2d 343 (Utah 
1980), cert, denied, 454 U.S. 897, 102 S. Ct. 
397, 70 L. Ed. 2d 212 (1981). 
Exception to section. 
—Assignee of resident's claim. 
Resident of Utah, who acquired claim upon 
which he based his right of action by virtue of 
assignment after cause of action had accrued 
thereon, did not come within exception to this 
section. Lawson v. Tripp, 34 Utah 28, 95 P. 520 
(1908). 
—State resident 
Accrual of cause of action. 
Only those persons who are Utah residents 
as of the date their cause of action arises come 
within the exception to this section. Allen v. 
Greyhound Lines, 583 P.2d 613 (Utah 1978). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
78-12-45. Action barred in another state barred here. 
When a cause of action has arisen in another state or territory, or in a 
foreign country, and by the laws thereof an action thereon cannot there be 
maintained against a person by reason of the lapse of time, an action thereon 
shall not be maintained against him in this state, except in favor of one who 
has been a citizen of this state and who has held the cause of action from the 
time it accrued. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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ADDENDUM B 
AGREEMENT TO PREPAY CLASS A OR CLASS B NOTE 
The undersiqned is aLimited Partner in Crane Development 
Limited Partnership and owns O/^e-CO Unit(s) in such 
PartnershiD. 
The undersianed hereby agrees to prepay the Class A or 
Class B Note contributed to the Partnership upon its formation, on 
the followinq terms and conditions: 
The undersiqned submits with this aqreement (check as 
applicable) : U 
/ v I elect to pay all cash. I submit cash in 
the amount of $34, DOfl per Unit or $ 
by check made payable to Crane Development 
Limited Partnership. 
I elect to pay no cash immediately. I attach a 
promissory note in the principal amount of 
$38,000 per Unit. 
I elect to pay partially in cash and partially 
bv execution of a promissory note. I enclose 
cash in the amount of $ . I also 
attach a promissory note in the principal 
amount of $ , determined by the 
following formula: 
Amount of Investor Note = £1 - amount of cash paid! X $38,000 
$34,500 
The undersiqned further represents that all material docu-
ments, includinq the Private Placement Memorandum, date October 
30, 1986, records, books, and any materials which he has requested 
pertaininq to this investment have been made available to him; and 
that they have been reviewed by him or his advisors prior to 
sianing this document, and he has had the opportunity to ask 
Questions of the principals of Diqitran or the Partnership. 
Except as disclosed to the Partnership and Digitran in 
writina, the undersiqned warrants that the Common Stock to be 
acauired by him is to be made solely on his own behalf for invest-
ment purposes of further re-sale or with a view to distribution or 
fractionalization thereof. 
The undersiqned is aware that the Common Stock is hiqhly 
speculative, and subject to substantial risks, and that he is 
capable of bearinq the hiqh degree of economic risk and burdens of 
such acquisition, including, but not limited to, the possibility 
of the comolete loss of all capital; the loss of all anticipated 
tax benefits and any adverse tax consequences; the lack of a 
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public market; and limited transferability such that it might not 
be possible to readily licruidate this investment so that his 
ownership thereof miqht continue indefinitely. 
No federal or state agency has made any finding or deter-
mination as to the fairness for public investment nor any recom-
mendation or endorsement of the Common Stock; and the Common Stock 
has not been reqistered with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission or with any state agency; nor is any registration to 
be obtained in the future. 
I understand that, in consideration of this prepayment: 
(i) DiqiCrane, Inc. will cancel and deliver to the 
Partnership, for return to me, mv Class A or Class B Note; 
(ii) DiqiCrane, Inc. and I will execute an amendment to my 
Guaranty and Assumption Aareement, so that I will guarantee only 
so much of the Partnership Note as is evidenced by my Investor 
Note (in principal and interest); 
(iii) The Partnership Note will be credited by DigiCrane, 
Inc. with an amount eaual to the difference between: (A) the 
outstanding principal balance on any Class A or Class B Note; and 
(B) the total of cash and the principal amount of my Investor 
Note; 
(iv) -Diqitran will issue to me its shares of Common Stock, 
as follows: 
(A) I will receive one share of Common Stock for each 
$0.75 contributed by me in cash upon execution of this Agreement. 
(B) As I pav installment payments on mv Investor Note, I 
will be entitled to have issued to me a number of shares of the 
Common Stock of Diqitran Systems, Inc. determined by reference to 
the last price, as published in the OTC "Pink Sheets" as of the 
last day of the calendar quarter immediately preceding such 
installment payment. I will receive shares at such price, less a 
10% discount. Common Stock will be issued to me promptly after 
the end of the quarter in which such installment payments are 
made. 
(v) I aqree that my Investor Note may be paid or prepaid 
out of any cash distributions made to me by the Partnership. 
(vi) I hereby waive and forever discharge any and all 
claims which I mav have had, whether known or unknown, liquidated 
or continqent, aqainst the Crane Development Limited Partnership; 
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Diaitran Systems, Inc.; Diqitran, Inc.; DigiCrane, Inc.; their 
officers, employees, aqents or attorneys, in relation to mv 
aqreeinq to become, or becominq a Limited Partner in the 
Partnership, or in relation to my execution and delivery of my 
Class A or Class B Note. 
(vii) I understand that the Common Stock to be issued to 
me will not be reqistered; that it will be "restricted" under Rule 
144 of the Securities Act of 1933; that it will not be freely 
transferable; and that the stock certificate will bear a legend to 
that effect. 
(viii) I also understand that this is a taxable 
transaction. 
(ix) I represent that I have read the Private Placement 
Memorandum dated November 10, 1986, and that I have obtained com-
petent advice with regard to those portions of the memorandum 
which I did not understand. I acknowledge that there exist cer-
tain risk factors and conflicts of interest. I represent that my 
correct domicile and address is as stated belov 
SIGNATURE OF INVESTOR 
PRINTED NAME __, /p 
ADDRESS s> 
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